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increased	 education	 aggrandizes	 inpatient	 utilization	 whereas	 it	 reduces	 outpatient	
health	 care	 utilization	 for	 both	 public	 and	 private	 health	 sectors.	 The	 estimates	 are	
strongly	robust	to	various	windows	of	the	sample	choice.	The	paper	also	discovers	that	
the	links	between	education	and	health	insurance	or	income	play	very	essential	roles	as	





















illness,	 or	 greater	 health	 habits.	 The	 health	 returns	 to	 education	 has	 been	 well-
documented	from	the	 literature	(Cutler	&	Lleras-Muney	2008;	Grossman	1976,	2006,	
2008,	2015).		
Previous	 studies	 focus	 on	 health	 status	 or	 outcomes.	 For	 example,	 health	





services	 utilized	 reflects	 the	 capability	 for	 producing	 improved	 health	 outcomes.	
Accessing	to	health	care	services	provides	opportunities	for	people	to	heal	illnesses	and	
rectify	 health	 problems,	 to	 diagnose	 and	 to	 make	 preventions	 for	 health	 risks,	 to	
mitigate	pains,	or	simply	to	know	health	status.	As	a	consequence,	health	care	utilization	






care	 services	 (Kruk	 &	 Freedman,	 2008;	 Murray	 &	 Frenk,	 2000;	 World	 Health	
Organization,	 2011).	 Boosting	 health	 care	 utilization	 towards	 universalization	 is	
therefore	very	impactful	for	any	country	especially	poor	countries	in	order	to	generate	
a	healthier	population	and	advance	a	national	 stock	of	health	human	capital	 as	well	





This	 paper	 importantly	 scrutinizes	 a	 supposition	 that	 education	 plays	 a	 very	
important	role	for	making	decisions	on	the	choice	of	medical	service	types	inasmuch	as	
people	with	various	schooling	level	probably	have	different	health-related	information	
or	 health	 knowledge	 that	 in	 turn	 determines	 health	 care	 utilization	 outcomes.	 This	
hypothesis	is	generally	congruous	with	the	idea	that	the	more	educated	tends	to	more	
acquire	and	better	handle	health	information	or	knowledge	from	Grossman’s	demand-
for-health	model	 (Grossman	 1972,	 1976,	 2000).	 In	 other	 words,	 people	 with	 higher	
schooling	 can	 enhance	 abilities	 to	 efficiently	 allocate	 given	 resources	 for	 health	
production,	 and	 better	 allocations	 of	 resources	 for	 health	 production	 successively	
produce	more	desirable	health	outcomes	in	general.		
Momentously,	a	substantial	obstacle	to	ameliorate	the	precise	comprehension	of	










drinking	 in	Australia.	 In	another	case,	Grépina	and	Bharadwaj	 (2015)	utilize	the	1980	
compulsory	secondary	schooling	law	to	find	that	maternal	education	makes	beneficial	
impacts	on	the	probability	of	child	survival	in	Zimbabwe.	Recently,	Leuven	et	al.	(2016)	
exploit	 a	 compulsory	 educational	 expansion	 during	 the	 1960s	 in	 Norway	 as	 an	
instrument	 for	 educational	 attainment	 to	 substantiate	 the	 protective	 effects	 of	
	 4	
education	 on	 health	 outcomes	with	 lower	 risks	 of	 lung	 and	prostate	 cancers	 among	
Norwegian	men.		
This	 study	 employs	 the	 Law	 on	 Universal	 Primary	 Education	 (LUPE)	which	was	
introduced	in	1991	in	Vietnam	to	instrument	for	exogeneous	shifts	in	schooling	year	to	
estimate	the	causal	impacts	of	schooling	year	on	health	care	utilization	in	this	transition	
economy.	Before	1991,	opportunities	 to	access	 to	education	were	not	applied	 for	all	
Vietnamese	 people,	 especially	 those	 from	 rural	 and	 remote	 areas	 because	 of	 the	
existence	 of	 widespread	 poverty	 and	 resource	 deficiencies.	 The	 LUPE	 following	 the	






Almost	 previous	 studies	 on	 the	 determinants	 of	 health	 care	 utilization	 mainly	
focuses	the	role	of	health	insurance.	The	existing	literature	seemingly	ignores	attention	
to	the	effects	of	schooling	on	the	demand	for	health	care	services	not	only	in	Vietnam	
but	 also	 in	 other	 countries.	 This	 study	 significantly	 aims	 to	 fulfill	 this	 indispensable	
research	gap.		
In	 terms	 of	 the	 finding,	 this	 study	 finds	 robust	 evidence	 that	 education	 does	
influence	the	choice	of	health	care	treatment	types	including	inpatient	and	outpatient	
medical	 treatments.	 The	 more	 educated	 tends	 to	 utilize	 more	 inpatient	 and	 less	
outpatient	services	for	both	public	and	private	health	sectors.	On	average	an	additional	
schooling	 year	 increases	 inpatient	 utilization	 outcomes,	 including	 the	 likelihood	 of	
doctor	visits	by	9.1–9.3%	and	18.9–19.6%,	the	number	of	doctor	visits	by	about	0.18	
visits	 and	 0.59–0.66	 visits,	 and	 out-of-pocket	 payments	 by	 nearly	 Vietnamese	 dong	
(VND)	 579	 thousand	 and	 VND	 2632–2737	 thousand	 for	 public	 and	 private	 sectors,	
																																																						








Furthermore,	 the	paper	 inspects	potential	pathways	that	might	account	 for	 the	
link	between	education	and	health	care	utilization	in	Vietnam.	Education	is	much	more	
likely	 to	 improve	 health-related	 outcomes	 by	 ways	 of	 the	 efficient	 allocation	 of	
resources	directly	or	 improving	other	benefits	 that	also	 lead	 to	better	health-related	
outcomes	 (Grossman,	 2006).	 This	 study	 focuses	 on	 two	main	 factors	 which	 include	
health	insurance	status	and	income	as	primary	mediators	for	the	establishment	of	the	
causal	relationship	between	education	and	health	care	utilization.	
This	 paper	 contributes	 to	 the	 existing	 literature	 in	 some	ways.	 First,	 the	 paper	
provides	empirical	evidence	on	the	causal	impact	of	education	on	health	care	utilization	
in	the	world.	Moreover,	this	study	is	specially	more	significant	when	it	is	conducted	in	a	















problem	 investigated	 in	 this	 study	 including	 information	about	 the	1991	 compulsory	
schooling	 reform	 and	 health	 care	 system	 and	 utilization	 in	 Vietnam.	Next,	 section	 3	
discusses	 estimation	 methods	 with	 a	 regression	 discontinuity	 design	 and	 section	 4	
presents	 data	 source	 and	 the	 descriptive	 statistics	 of	 the	 sample.	 Meanwhile,	 the	
baseline	estimates	of	the	causal	impacts	of	schooling	on	health	care	utilization	outcomes	
are	 reported	 in	 section	 5	 while	 the	 robustness	 checks	 of	 the	 baseline	 results	 using	
various	 windows	 to	 creating	 subsamples	 are	 demonstrated	 in	 section	 6.	 Section	 7	












aged	6	must	go	to	 the	 first	grade	 (grade	1)	and	complete	 the	 last	grade	 (grade	5)	of	
primary	 education	 at	 the	 maximum	 age	 of	 14.	 Prior	 to	 the	 reform,	 there	 was	 no	
compulsory	education	policy	in	Vietnam	and	Vietnamese	children	were	not	forced	to	go	
to	school	for	any	level.	An	individuals’	educational	attainment	depended	on	his	or	her	











LUPE	 regulated	 that	 the	 academic	 curriculum	 should	 emphasize	 the	 provision	 of	
academic	foundations	for	pupils’s	early	understanding	of	people,	nature	and	the	society	
arround	them	in	addition	to	the	core	skills	including	speaking,	reading,	writing,	and	basic	





children	 from	 rural,	 isolated	 and	 remote	 areas	 where	 children	 traditionally	 had	
diminutive	 opportunities	 to	 go	 to	 schools.	 The	 implement	 of	 LUPE	 generated	 some	















After	 the	 1975	 unification	 of	 the	 nation,	 Vietnam	 undertook	 its	 strategy	 of	
development	based	on	a	centrally	planned	economy.	In	this	context,	Vietnam	maitained	
a	fully	stated-based	health	care	system	in	which	the	government	delivered	and	financed	




services	 because	 of	 lack	 of	 investment	 resources	 facing	 this	 low-income	 country	
(Matsuda,	1997).		
When	Vietnam	carried	out	its	economic	reform	in	1986	under	the	name	of	Doimoi	
(renovation),	 there	were	 changes	 in	 the	 functioning	 structure	of	health	 care	 system.	
Some	key	public	policies	were	implemented	to	inaugurate	a	new	plan	of	action	to	govern	
Vietnam’s	 health	 care	 system	 that	 was	 so-called	 “socialization	 of	 health	 care,”	 for	
examples	the	application	of	user	fee	for	public	health	providers	in	1989,	the	introduction	
of	health	insurance	in	1992,	and	the	financial	autonomy	for	selected	public	health	care	
facilities	 in	 2002	 (Thanh	 et	 al.,	 2014).	 These	 policies	 increased	 the	 mobilization	 of	
resources	 for	 health	 care	 practices	within	 the	 economy.	Moreover,	 the	 capability	 of	
health	care	service	provision	was	therefore	expanded	considerably	in	both	the	quantity,	
i.e.	many	health	care	providers	and	facilities	from	both	public	and	private	sectors	were	





More	 importantly,	 private	 health	 care	 practices	 have	been	 accepted	 in	 parallel	
with	the	public	health	sector	since	1989	(Lönnroth	et	al.,	1998).	The	market-based	or	
non-state	 health	 care	 practices	 have	 been	 more	 impetuously	 functioned	 and	










emphasize	 the	 separation	 of	 health	 care	 utilization	 outcomes	 between	 public	 and	
private	 sectors	when	 investigating	 health	 care	 utilization	 in	 Vietnam.	 In	 this	 study,	 I	
provides	the	estimates	of	the	health	care	utilization	impacts	of	education	for	both	public	
and	private	health	sectors.	










disadvantaged	 families	 (Nguyen,	 2016;	 Palmer,	 2015).	 This	 study	 in	 a	 different	





To	examine	 the	association	between	 schooling	year	and	health	 care	utilization,	
one	in	principle	estimates	the	following	regression	equation:		
!" = $% + $'(" + $)*"+ + ,- + ./ + 0" 																																							(1)	
where	!" 	indicate	an	utilization	outcome	for	health	care	service	for	individual	1,	in	year	
survey	 2	 and	 from	 birth	 cohort	 3;	 (" 	 is	 the	 number	 of	 schooling	 year	 for	 the	
corresponding	respondent;	*"+	 is	a	vector	of	characteristics	of	the	respondent	such	as	
male,	urban,	majority,	and	dummies	for	six	geographical	regions;	,-	indexes	for	survey	
year	fixed	effects;	./ 	presents	cohort	fixed	effects;	and	0" 	 is	the	corresponding	error	
term.	The	coefficient	of	 interest	 from	equation	 (1)	 is	$'	 that	 indicates	 the	 impact	of	
schooling	year	on	health	care	utilization.	However,	OLS	estimate	using	equation	(1)	likely	
yields	 an	 biased	 estimate	 of	$'	 due	 to	 the	 endogeneity	 problem	 of	 the	 association	
beween	 education	 and	 health	 care	 utilization.	 The	 problem	 is	 potentially	 originated	
from	the	existence	of	unobserved	characteristics	that	affects	both	one’s	education	and	
health	care	utilization.		
To	 overcome	 the	 problem	 of	 endogeneity	 between	 schooling	 and	 health	 care	
utilization	the	paper	uses	the	1991	compulsory	schooling	reform	as	a	reliable	exogenous	





(" = 4% + 4'5" + 4)*"+ + ,- + ./ + 6" 																																							(2)	
where	5" 	 is	 schooling	 reform	exposure,	or	a	dummy	variable	 for	whether	 the	age	of	




!" = C% + C'(" + C)*"+ + ,- + ./ + D" 																																							(3)	
where	the	coefficient	of	 interest	 (C')	 is	 infered	as	 the	causal	 impact	of	education	on	
health	care	utilization.	This	coefficient	apparently	indicates	the	local	average	treatment	
effect	(LATE)	of	the	impacts	of	schooling	in	health	care	utilization.		
In	 addition	 using	 the	 instrumental	 variable	 (IV)	 approach	 for	 a	 RDD	 as	 an	
identification	 strategy	 to	 produce	 the	 baseline	 estimates,	 the	 study	 also	 estimates	
intent-to-treat	(ITT)	models	as	reduced	form	regressions	using	the	following	regression	
form:		




effect	 of	 schooling	 on	 health	 care	 utilization	 corresponding	 to	 data	 type	 of	 the	
dependent	variable.	First,	in	the	case	that	a	dependent	variable	is	measured	by	a	binary	
variable	(the	probability	of	doctor	visits)	the	paper	employs	an	IV-Probit	model.	Second,	
an	 IV-Poisson	 is	 employed	when	 a	 dependent	 variable	 is	measured	 by	 a	 count	 data	










Vietnam	 that	 has	 conducted	 biannually	 to	 elicit	 Vietnamese	 households’	 socio-
economic,	 demographic	 and	 information	 about	multiple	 aspects	 of	 living	 conditions.	
VHLSS	is	very	highly	common	source	of	data	that	has	been	used	for	numerous	published	
studies	 on	 the	 realms	 of	 economics,	 sociology,	 public	 health	 and	 development	 in	
Vietnam.	Using	VHLSS,	this	paper	is	therefore	strongly	confident	about	the	high	quality	
of	data.		







consists	 of	 the	 birth	 cohorts	 between	 1968	 and	 1985.	 As	 a	 consequence,	 the	 total	
observations	 of	 the	 sample	 is	 27,271	 individuals.	 Among	 them,	 there	 are	 12,909	
individuals	for	the	treatment	group	while	there	are	14,362	respondents	for	the	control	
group.	Equivalently,	about	47.3%	of	observations	in	the	sample	are	influenced	by	the	
1991	 schooling	 reform.	 We	 can	 see	 there	 is	 a	 highly	 balanced	 ratio	 between	 the	
treatment	and	control	groups	 in	this	study.	The	descriptive	statistics	of	the	sample	 is	
specifically	presented	in	Table	1.3		















the	 first	 stage	 in	 which	 the	 impacts	 of	 the	 1991	 compulsory	 schooling	 reform	 on	
educational	outcome	are	presented.	For	the	causal	impacts	of	education	on	health	care	














impacts	 on	 full	 schooling	 year	 for	 both	 simple	 and	 full	 models.	 The	 estimated	
coefficients	are	all	statistically	significant	at	1%.		






to	 other	 studies	 for	 Vietnam.	 For	 example,	 Dang	 (2017)	 discovers	 that	 the	 1991	
compulsory	 educational	 reform	 in	 Vietnam	 only	 creates	 increases	 of	 1.12–1.27	
schooling	years.	However,	it	is	helful	to	note	that	Dang	(2017)	uses	a	comparatively	small	
sample	from	World	Values	Survey	that	only	consists	of	about	1000–1500	observations.	
This	 study	 takes	 an	 advantage	 of	 a	 large	 and	 nationally	 representative	 sample	 from	





group	 whose	 observations	 aged	 14	 or	 less	 than	 14	 in	 1991.	 Intuitively,	 the	 1991	
compulsory	 schooling	 reform	 in	 Vietnam	 provides	 a	 discontinuity	 on	 the	 trend	 of	
educational	outcome	that	is	feasibly	employed	as	an	instrument	for	exogenous	changes	
in	education	using	a	sample	in	this	study.		
More	 importantly,	 F-stat	 values	 for	 two	 models	 are	 all	 larger	 than	 10	 as	 a	



































public	 health	 sector	 (Panel	 A),	 and	 approximately	 0.66	 times	 using	 a	 simple	 model	












of	 education	 on	 the	 number	 of	 outpatient	 visits	 from	 private	 and	 public	 health	
providers.	
Turning	 to	 the	 health	 care	 expenditure	 impacts	 of	 education,	 the	 findings	
presented	in	Table	5	show	that	education	leads	to	considerable	increases	in	health	care	
spending.	 For	 instance,	 an	 additional	 year	 of	 schooling	 causes	 an	 increase	 in	 health	
spending	from	the	public	health	sector	by	about	VND	579	thousand	for	both	simple	and	




approximately	 VND	 2,737	 thousand	 using	 a	 simple	model	 (column	 1)	 or	 VND	 2,632	
thousand	using	a	full	model	(column	2).		
In	 the	opposite	 direction,	 education	 leads	 to	decreases	 in	 out-of-pocket	 health	










in	Vietnam	using	a	 reduced-form	regression	 form.	The	estimated	coefficients	 for	 the	










age	 in	 1991	 including	 (i)	 7–22	 with	 24,131	 observations,	 (ii)	 8–21	 with	 21,107	
observations,	 (iii)	 9–20	 with	 17,798	 observations,	 and	 (iv)	 10–19	 with	 14,598	
observations.4		










4	 When	 using	 various	 sub-samples,	 the	 paper	 also	 finds	 statistically	 significant	 impacts	 of	 the	 1991	
compulsory	primary	schooling	reform	on	full	schooling	year	although	the	magnitudes	of	the	impacts	are	
relatively	 smaller	 than	 the	estimates	using	baseline	samples.	The	 results	of	 first-stage	estimates	using	
various	sub-samples	are	specifically	presented	in	Table	A4	of	Appendices.		
	 18	
shown	 in	 Panel	 B	 of	 Table	 6.	 The	 signs	 of	 the	 impacts	 are	 all	 negative	 and	 more	
importantly	the	estimated	coefficients	lose	its	statistical	significance	at	traditional	levels.	




in	 1991	 of	 10–19	 for	 the	 private	 health	 sector	 (Panel	 B).	 Generally,	 education	 has	
negative	effects	on	the	probability	of	outpatient	visits.	In	particular,	an	additional	year	
of	 schooling	 is	 causally	 related	 to	decreases	 in	 the	probability	of	outpatient	visits	by	
about	 8.1–10.8%	 using	 a	 simple	model	 (column	 1)	 or	 8.8–12.7%	 using	 a	 full	 model	
(column	2)	 for	 the	public	health	sector	 (Panel	A),	and	9–11.7%	using	a	simple	model	




facilities,	almost	estimated	coefficients	 lose	 its	 statistical	 significance	at	conventional	
levels	 as	 shown	 in	 Panel	 A.	 Exceptionally,	 the	 paper	 finds	 the	 statistically	 significant	
impacts	 for	 a	 subsample	 of	 8–21	 age	 in	 1991.	 In	 particular,	 the	 postive	 impacts	 as	
consequences	of	having	an	additional	schooling	year	are	increases	of	0.15	visits	using	a	
simple	model	(column	1)	or	0.16	visits	using	a	full	model	(column	2).		




















estimates	 as	 in	 Table	 5.	 However,	 the	 estimates	 lose	 its	 statistical	 significance.	 In	
contrast,	 the	estimates	 for	public	 inpatient	visit	expenditure	maintain	 its	consistency	
with	increases	of	roughly	VND	604–825	thousand	using	a	simple	model	(column	1)	or	
















associations	 between	 schooling	 year	 and	 the	 probability	 of	 health	 insurance	 and	
income.	The	estimated	coefficients	all	are	strongly	significant	with	1%.		







Specifically,	 the	 1991	 compulsory	 schooling	 reform	 rises	 the	 probability	 of	 health	
insurance	by	19.8%	using	a	simple	model	(column	1)	or	18.7%	using	a	full	model	(column	
2).	 Moreover,	 Figure	 A1	 geographically	 demonstrates	 that	 the	 1991	 compulsory	























Second,	 income	 is	 another	 potential	 mediator	 used	 to	 account	 for	 the	 causal	
impact	of	education	on	health	care	utilization.	The	impacts	of	schooling	year	on	income	
using	an	IV	regression	form	are	presented	in	Panel	B	of	Table	9.	The	paper	finds	that	
education	 produces	 apparent	 increases	 in	 a	 respondent’s	 monthly	 income,	 and	 the	
estimated	 efficients	 are	 statistically	 significant	 at	 1%.	One	 schooling	 year	 is	 in	 detail	
linked	 to	 increments	 in	monthly	 income	by	VND	178	 thousand	using	a	 simple	model	
(column	1)	or	VND	172	thousand	using	a	full	model	(column	2).	Furthermore,	employing	
a	reduced	form	regression	equation,	the	paper	also	finds	favorable	impacts	of	the	1991	
compulsory	 schooling	 reform	on	monthly	 income	with	 corresponding	 rises	 of	 nearly	
VND	427	thousand	using	a	simple	model	(column	1)	or	VND	436	thousand	using	a	full	
model	(column	2)	as	depicted	in	Panel	B	of	Table	A4.	Graphically,	Figure	A2	reveals	a	
considerable	 shift	 of	 monthly	 income	 for	 a	 respondent	 from	 the	 treatment	 group	
compared	to	one	from	the	control	group.		
It	 is	 academically	 undoubted	 that	 income	plays	 an	 essential	 role	 for	 improving	
health-related	 outcomes	 (Ettner,	 1996;	 Frijters	 et	 al.,	 2005;	 Marmot,	 2002).	 Richer	
people	 have	 more	 financial	 conditions	 to	 access	 more	 health	 care	 services	 and	
treatments,	for	examples	regular	diagnoses,	protective	services,	or	meticulous	medical	





than	 rich	 ones	 over	 last	 decades	 in	 Vietnam	 and	 the	 gap	 in	 health	 care	 utilization	









illnesses	 and	 thus	 the	 magnification	 of	 health	 care	 utilization	 is	 significantly	
acknowledged	as	a	primary	strategy	for	mastering	the	stock	of	health	human	capital	of	





Acorrdingly,	 education	 increases	 inpatient	 health	 care	 services	 whereas	 it	 reduces	
outpatient	 services.	 Furthermore,	 the	 favourable	 impact	 of	 schooling	 on	 inpatient	
service	utilization	 is	exceptionally	 larger	 for	 the	private	health	sector	 than	the	public	











Also,	 tt	 is	 essential	 to	 inspect	 the	 question	 of	 what	 potentially	 motivates	 the	








In	 addition,	 income	 vastly	 affects	 the	 pattern	 of	 health	 care	 utilization.	 In	 an	
income-restricted	country	like	Vietnam	the	poor	has	low	likelihoods	to	access	to	high	
quality	 health	 care	 services.	 Therefore,	 almost	 poor	 people	 select	 outpatient	 health	
services	 that	 cost	 them	 payable	 bugets	 rather	 than	 inpatient	 health	 services	 with	
relatively	high	spending	(O'Donnell	et	al.,	2008;	Thoa	et	al.,	2013).	Expanded	education	
apparently	leads	to	increases	in	income.	Therefore,	citizens	with	higher	education	tend	




outpatient	health	 care	 services	 in	 this	 study	 is	 very	 interesting	because	 it	provides	a	
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Variable	 Full	sample	 	 Treatment	 	 Control	
Mean	 SD	 	 Mean	 SD	 	 Mean	 SD	
Health	care	utilization	outcomes		 	 	 	 	
Public	health	care	services	 	 	 	 	
Probability	of	inpatient	visit		 0.066	 0.248	 	 0.075	 0.263	 	 0.057	 0.232	
Probability	of	outpatient	visit		 0.208	 0.406	 	 0.188	 0.391	 	 0.225	 0.418	
Frequency	of	inpatient	visit	 0.086	 0.397	 	 0.094	 0.399	 	 0.079	 0.396	
Frequency	of	outpatient	visit	 0.561	 1.742	 	 0.490	 1.566	 	 0.624	 1.883	
Per	inpatient	visit	expenditure	 184.877	 1461.102	 	 200.078	 1408.507	 	 171.213	 1506.728	
Per	outpatient	visit	expenditure	 76.442	 408.809	 	 62.429	 365.140	 	 89.038	 444.050	
Private	health	care	services	 	 	 	 	
Probability	of	inpatient	visit		 0.005	 0.068	 	 0.005	 0.068	 	 0.005	 0.067	
Probability	of	outpatient	visit		 0.143	 0.350	 	 0.128	 0.334	 	 0.157	 0.363	
Frequency	of	inpatient	visit	 0.007	 0.167	 	 0.005	 0.084	 	 0.009	 0.216	
Frequency	of	outpatient	visit	 0.441	 1.726	 	 0.366	 1.431	 	 0.509	 1.951	
Per	inpatient	visit	expenditure	 17.610	 395.900	 	 19.822	 405.258	 	 15.621	 387.301	
Per	outpatient	visit	expenditure	 38.100	 223.924	 	 28.975	 178.727	 	 46.301	 257.606	
Main	control	variables	 	 	 	 	
Male		 0.495	 0.500	 	 0.501	 0.500	 	 0.490	 0.500	
Urban	 0.308	 0.462	 	 0.319	 0.466	 	 0.299	 0.458	
Majority	 0.836	 0.370	 	 0.842	 0.365	 	 0.831	 0.375	
Red	river	delta		 0.192	 0.394	 	 0.199	 0.400	 	 0.186	 0.389	
Midlands	and	northern	mountainous	
areas		
0.177	 0.382	 	 0.170	 0.375	 	 0.184	 0.388	
Northern	and	coastal	central	region		 0.216	 0.411	 	 0.207	 0.405	 	 0.223	 0.417	
Central	highlands		 0.072	 0.258	 	 0.069	 0.254	 	 0.074	 0.261	
Southeast	area		 0.126	 0.332	 	 0.134	 0.341	 	 0.118	 0.323	
Mekong	river	delta		 0.217	 0.412	 	 0.220	 0.415	 	 0.214	 0.410	
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Survey	2010	 0.341	 0.474	 	 0.345	 0.475	 	 0.338	 0.473	
Survey	2012	 0.333	 0.471	 	 0.329	 0.470	 	 0.336	 0.472	
Survey	2014	 0.326	 0.469	 	 0.326	 0.469	 	 0.326	 0.469	
Potential	mechanisms	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
Health	insurance	 0.478	 0.500	 	 0.504	 0.500	 	 0.456	 0.498	
Income	 1191.557	 2033.040	 	 1422.818	 2164.166	 	 983.692	 1883.500	
Schooling	variables		 	 	 	 	
Reform	exposure	 0.473	 0.499	 	 1.000	 0.000	 	 0.000	 0.000	
Schooling	year	 8.449	 3.948	 	 9.337	 3.703	 	 7.652	 3.991	







































Dependent	variable	 Panel	A.	Public	health	sector	 	 Panel	B.	Private	health	sector	
(1)	 (2)	 	 (1)	 (2)	
Probability	of	inpatient	visit	 0.091***	(0.032)	 0.093***	(0.030)	 	 0.196**	(0.091)	 0.189**	(0.087)	
Probability	of	outpatient	visit	 –0.129***	(0.027)	 –0.118***	(0.026)	 	 –0.121***	(0.025)	 –0.107***	(0.026)	
Controls	 No	 Yes	 	 No	 Yes	
Survey	year	fixed	effects	 Yes	 Yes	 	 Yes	 Yes	
Birth	cohort	fixed	effects	 Yes	 Yes	 	 Yes	 Yes	
























Dependent	variable	 Panel	A.	Public	health	sector	 	 Panel	B.	Private	health	sector	
(1)	 (2)	 	 (1)	 (2)	
Frequency	of	inpatient	visit	 0.177***	(0.066)	 0.179***	(0.063)	 	 0.657**	(0.283)	 0.585**	(0.266)	
Frequency	of	outpatient	visit	 –0.177***	(0.051)	 –0.151***	(0.049)	 	 –0.191***	(0.051)	 –0.156***	(0.050)	
Controls	 No	 Yes	 	 No	 Yes	
Survey	year	fixed	effects	 Yes	 Yes	 	 Yes	 Yes	
Birth	cohort	fixed	effects	 Yes	 Yes	 	 Yes	 Yes	
























Dependent	variable	 Panel	A.	Public	health	sector	 	 Panel	B.	Private	health	sector	
(1)	 (2)	 	 (1)	 (2)	
Per	inpatient	visit	expenditure	 578.611**	(264.267)	 578.916**	(255.357)	 	 2736.949**	(1283.959)	 2631.666**	(1217.269)	
Per	outpatient	visit	expenditure	 –149.615***	(37.764)	 –135.754***	(35.700)	 	 –102.022***	(18.876)	 –90.572***	(18.859)	
Controls	 No	 Yes	 	 No	 Yes	
Survey	year	fixed	effects	 Yes	 Yes	 	 Yes	 Yes	
Birth	cohort	fixed	effects	 Yes	 Yes	 	 Yes	 Yes	






















Dependent	variable	 Panel	A.	Public	health	sector	 	 Panel	B.	Private	health	sector	
(1)	 (2)	 	 (1)	 (2)	
Probability	of	inpatient	visit	 	 	 	 	 	
age	in	1991:	7–22	(N=24,131)	 0.075**	(0.032)	 0.079**	(0.037)	 	 –0.013	(0.089)	 –0.015	(0.102)	
age	in	1991:	8–21	(N=21,107)	 0.089***	(0.030)	 0.092***	(0.033)	 	 –0.106	(0.076)	 –0.116	(0.079)	
age	in	1991:	9–20	(N=17,798)	 0.088**	(0.043)	 0.096**	(0.043)	 	 –0.059	(0.088)	 –0.057	(0.091)	
age	in	1991:	10–19	(N=14,598)	 0.087*	(0.052)	 0.126**	(0.058)	 	 –0.082	(0.113)	 –0.082	(0.137)	
Probability	of	outpatient	visit	 	 	 	 	 	
age	in	1991:	7–22	(N=24,131)	 –0.108***	(0.027)	 –0.127***	(0.030)	 	 –0.100***	(0.033)	 –0.119***	(0.035)	
age	in	1991:	8–21	(N=21,107)	 –0.088***	(0.023)	 –0.094***	(0.024)	 	 –0.117***	(0.028)	 –0.113***	(0.030)	
age	in	1991:	9–20	(N=17,798)	 –0.081**	(0.038)	 –0.088**	(0.040)	 	 –0.090***	(0.037)	 –0.103***	(0.038)	
age	in	1991:	10–19	(N=14,598)	 –0.094***	(0.035)	 –0.090**	(0.039)	 	 –0.039	(0.039)	 –0.039	(0.042)	
Controls	 No	 Yes	 	 No	 Yes	
Survey	year	fixed	effects	 Yes	 Yes	 	 Yes	 Yes	

















Dependent	variable	 Panel	A.	Public	health	sector	 	 Panel	B.	Private	health	sector	
(1)	 (2)	 	 (1)	 (2)	
Frequency	of	inpatient	visit	 	 	 	 	 	
age	in	1991:	7–22	(N=24,131)	 0.067	(0.071)	 0.081	(0.082)	 	 –0.049	(0.270)	 –0.043	(0.304)	
age	in	1991:	8–21	(N=21,107)	 0.149*	(0.084)	 0.161*	(0.089)	 	 –0.317	(0.231)	 –0.324	(0.233)	
age	in	1991:	9–20	(N=17,798)	 0.130	(0.107)	 0.150	(0.105)	 	 –0.782**	(0.324)	 –0.807**	(0.350)	
age	in	1991:	10–19	(N=14,598)	 0.119	(0.113)	 0.174	(0.127)	 	 –0.944**	(0.434)	 –1.015**	(0.488)	
Frequency	of	outpatient	visit	 	 	 	 	 	
age	in	1991:	7–22	(N=24,131)	 –0.195***	(0.056)	 –0.216***	(0.063)	 	 –0.242***	(0.077)	 –0.271***	(0.078)	
age	in	1991:	8–21	(N=21,107)	 –0.199***	(0.043)	 –0.197***	(0.044)	 	 –0.229***	(0.055)	 –0.207***	(0.055)	
age	in	1991:	9–20	(N=17,798)	 –0.191**	(0.081)	 –0.204**	(0.083)	 	 –0.348***	(0.093)	 –0.379***	(0.095)	
age	in	1991:	10–19	(N=14,598)	 –0.190**	(0.078)	 –0.190**	(0.085)	 	 –0.280***	(0.103)	 –0.313***	(0.107)	
Controls	 No	 Yes	 	 No	 Yes	
Survey	year	fixed	effects	 Yes	 Yes	 	 Yes	 Yes	

















Dependent	variable	 Panel	A.	Public	health	sector	 	 Panel	B.	Private	health	sector	
(1)	 (2)	 	 (1)	 (2)	
Per	inpatient	visit	expenditure	 	 	 	 	 	
age	in	1991:	7–22	(N=24,131)	 641.841**	(257.463)	 641.020**	(298.625)	 	 –993.807	(1627.693)	 –1165.676	(1838.347)	
age	in	1991:	8–21	(N=21,107)	 604.206**	(271.727)	 603.512**	(292.621)	 	 –1248.346	(1080.249)	 –1372.602	(1103.281)	
age	in	1991:	9–20	(N=17,798)	 679.252*	(369.410)	 713.719*	(368.959)	 	 286.939	(1491.327)	 572.297	(1509.166)	
age	in	1991:	10–19	(N=14,598)	 825.468*	(453.812)	 1108.580**	(520.689)	 	 –1708.526	(1664.941)	 –1910.462	(1957.477)	
Per	outpatient	visit	expenditure	 	 	 	 	 	
age	in	1991:	7–22	(N=24,131)	 –140.637***	(32.388)	 –166.222***	(36.131)	 	 –92.769***	(24.375)	 –107.774***	(26.061)	
age	in	1991:	8–21	(N=21,107)	 –120.505***	(28.940)	 –123.789***	(30.297)	 	 –88.002***	(19.592)	 –85.350***	(20.733)	
age	in	1991:	9–20	(N=17,798)	 –106.911**	(45.287)	 –113.220**	(46.370)	 	 –90.361***	(29.474)	 –96.857***	(28.994)	
age	in	1991:	10–19	(N=14,598)	 –146.626***	(38.462)	 –159.770***	(42.687)	 	 –34.558	(25.919)	 –35.354	(27.345)	
Controls	 No	 Yes	 	 No	 Yes	
Survey	year	fixed	effects	 Yes	 Yes	 	 Yes	 Yes	





















	 Panel	A.	Health	insurance	 	 Panel	B.	Income	
(1)	 (2)	 	 (1)	 (2)	
Schooling	year		 0.082***	(0.024)	 0.074***	(0.025)	 	 178.0908***	(43.447)	 172.220***	(33.035)	
Model		 IV-Probit	 IV-Probit	 	 IV	 IV	
Controls	 No	 Yes	 	 No	 Yes	
Survey	year	fixed	effects	 Yes	 Yes	 	 Yes	 Yes	
Cohort	fixed	effects	 Yes	 Yes	 	 Yes	 Yes	






























































































Dependent	variable	 Panel	A.	Public	health	sector	 	 Panel	B.	Private	health	sector	
(1)	 (2)	 	 (1)	 (2)	
Probability	of	inpatient	visit	 0.219***	(0.076)	 0.234***	(0.077)	 	 0.470**	(0.217)	 0.479**	(0.222)	
Probability	of	outpatient	visit	 –0.309***	(0.064)	 –0.299***	(0.065)	 	 –0.291***	(0.061)	 –0.270***	(0.066)	
Controls	 No	 Yes	 	 No	 Yes	
Survey	year	fixed	effects	 Yes	 Yes	 	 Yes	 Yes	
Birth	cohort	fixed	effects	 Yes	 Yes	 	 Yes	 Yes	






















Dependent	variable	 Panel	A.	Public	health	sector	 	 Panel	B.	Private	health	sector	
(1)	 (2)	 	 (1)	 (2)	
Frequency	of	inpatient	visit	 0.424***	(0.158)	 0.453***	(0.160)	 	 1.577**	(0.679)	 1.482**	(0.673)	
Frequency	of	outpatient	visit	 –0.425***	(0.123)	 –0.382***	(0.123)	 	 –0.458***	(0.123)	 –0.395***	(0.127)	
Controls	 No	 Yes	 	 No	 Yes	
Survey	year	fixed	effects	 Yes	 Yes	 	 Yes	 Yes	
Birth	cohort	fixed	effects	 Yes	 Yes	 	 Yes	 Yes	

























Dependent	variable	 Panel	A.	Public	health	sector	 	 Panel	B.	Private	health	sector	
(1)	 (2)	 	 (1)	 (2)	
Per	inpatient	visit	expenditure	 1388.751**	(634.279)	 1466.211**	(646.738)	 	 6569.080**	(3081.692)	 6665.175**	(3082.956)	
Per	outpatient	visit	expenditure	 –359.098***	(90.639)	 –343.837***	(90.422)	 	 –244.869***	(45.304)	 –229.391***	(47.764)	
Controls	 No	 Yes	 	 No	 Yes	
Survey	year	fixed	effects	 Yes	 Yes	 	 Yes	 Yes	
Birth	cohort	fixed	effects	 Yes	 Yes	 	 Yes	 Yes	




















Age	in	1991:	7–22	 	 Age	in	1991:	8–21	 	 Age	in	1991:	9–20	 	 Age	in	1991:	10–19	
(1)	 (2)	 	 (1)	 (2)	 	 (1)	 (2)	 	 (1)	 (2)	
Reform	exposure	 2.124***	(0.244)	 1.905***	(0.172)	 	 2.447***	(0.210)	 2.287***	(0.183)	 	 1.695***	(0.197)	 1.667***	(0.163)	 	 1.620***	(0.197)	 1.408***	(0.167)	
Male	 	 0.477***	(0.060)	 	 	 0.485***	(0.061)	 	 	 0.489***	(0.065)	 	 	 0.535***	(0.069)	
Urban	 	 2.301***	(0.169)	 	 	 2.314***	(0.176)	 	 	 2.419***	(0.191)	 	 	 2.506***	(0.189)	
Majority	 	 2.753***	(0.260)	 	 	 2.808***	(0.268)	 	 	 2.781***	(0.263)	 	 	 2.746***	(0.259)	
Red	river	delta	 	 2.732***	(0.357)	 	 	 2.742***	(0.369)	 	 	 2.726***	(0.390)	 	 	 2.730***	(0.380)	
Midlands	and	northern	
mountainous	areas	
	 1.903***	(0.249)	 	 	 1.923***	(0.253)	 	 	 1.876***	(0.266)	 	 	 1.791***	(0.268)	
Northern	and	coastal	central	
region	
	 1.487***	(0.307)	 	 	 1.453***	(0.305)	 	 	 1.398***	(0.326)	 	 	 1.360***	(0.317)	
Central	highlands	 	 1.295***	(0.237)	 	 	 1.256***	(0.227)	 	 	 1.242***	(0.213)	 	 	 1.125***	(0.223)	
Southeastern	area	 	 1.020***	(0.317)	 	 	 1.006***	(0.301)	 	 	 1.029***	(0.299)	 	 	 1.041***	(0.264)	
Mekong	river	delta	 	 Omitted	 	 	 Omitted	 	 	 Omitted	 	 	 Omitted	
Survey	year	fixed	effects	 Yes	 Yes	 	 Yes	 Yes	 	 Yes	 Yes	 	 Yes	 Yes	
Cohort	fixed	effects	 Yes	 Yes	 	 Yes	 Yes	 	 Yes	 Yes	 	 Yes	 Yes	
Constant	 7.718***	(0.241)	 3.201***	(0.347)	 	 7.440***	(0.265)	 2.877***	(0.358)	 	 7.914***	(0.266)	 3.115***	(0.330)	 	 7.609***	(0.276)	 2.997***	(0.348)	
F-stat	 25.02	 40.57	 	 19.57	 43.62	 	 16.92	 37.11	 	 15.80	 42.60	
R-squared	 0.051	 0.258	 	 0.046	 0.256	 	 0.035	 0.251	 	 0.028	 0.252	






















	 Panel	A.	Health	insurance	 	 Panel	B.	Income	









Model		 IV-Probit	 IV-Probit	 	 IV	 IV	
Controls	 No	 Yes	 	 No	 Yes	
Survey	year	fixed	effects	 Yes	 Yes	 	 Yes	 Yes	
Cohort	fixed	effects	 Yes	 Yes	 	 Yes	 Yes	
Observations	 27,271	 27,271	 	 27,271	 27,271	
Note:	***p	<	0.01,	**p	<	0.05,	*p	<	0.1.	Robust	standard	errors	are	clustered	at	the	provincial	level	and	reported	in	parenthesis.	Controls	consist	
of	male,	urban,	majority,	and	dummies	for	six	geographical	regions.			
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Figure	A1.	The	impact	of	the	1991	schooling	reform	on	probability	of	health	
insurance	
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Figure	A2.	The	impact	of	the	1991	schooling	reform	on	income	
	
	
